Coping With Unrivalled Power


Avis Bohlen was most recently a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, working on a lengthy paper on the rise and fall of arms control. Avis had spent 25 years working on arms control and European security issues. She served as assistant secretary of state for arms control from the Clinton administration (1999) through the first two years of the George W. Bush administration. Prior to that, Avis worked with the first Bush administration on arms control issues. She served as ambassador to Bulgaria (1996–1999); deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Paris; and deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs.

Recently, as she worked on numerous articles and prepared for a State Department speaking tour, Avis shared her views, excerpted here:

“The great central fact of the international situation today is the United States’ position of unrivaled power. The enormity of that power is most obvious, of course, in military might—our global capacity to exert force. We have no rivals. It’s also clear in the economic domain: we produce 30 percent of the world’s GDP (gross domestic product). We also have cultural power: quite apart from Coca Cola, McDonald’s or jazz, our democratic institutions hold tremendous appeal, even today in view of our relative unpopularity. How we come to grips with that power, how our allies do, will set the direction for this century. We are all grappling with that reality, and there are no set answers.

“In Washington today there are two points of view. The first is that we should act in what we define is our own self-interest, in response to what we perceive as threats. While having willing partners is desirable, we should not be constrained by the lack of allies. This view creates its own legitimacy; it is the position of the current administration.

“The second view is more reluctant to deploy military power. It is more conscious of the unintended consequences of military action, is more heedful of allies’ views, and is hesitant to act alone. This group believes in the value of developing and cultivating coalitions. Those of this persuasion seek to use military power only as a last resort.
“There are also two views in Europe, as we saw during the Iraq War. The British decided to hew closely to the U. S. and attempt, from within, to influence our action. The French tried to counterbalance American power, more strongly than at other times, and in that way to restrain us. Neither of these two approaches was successful, ultimately, in significantly influencing our course of action in Iraq.

“The outcome of the war might be seen as a vindication of the first point of view, but we cannot say that yet. Winning the war was relatively easy compared with the difficulty of winning the peace. We were laggard in our planning for the post-war phase, and while we may have anticipated such problems as the gaps in electric power and the water supply, we did not anticipate the breakdown of law and order, the problem of needing a police force.

“This outcome is one reason why I hold the second point of view: We should not renounce the use of force, but we should only use it as a last option. Use of force inevitably gives rise to a complicated chain of unintended consequences; it’s hard to pick up the pieces.
“‘Rebuilding’ has not been a real success in any other of our recent engagements: Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan. Despite the resources we’ve committed, we have not been able to create lasting order. As a country we have not faced up to the fact that reconstruction requires a complex, sustained effort—an ongoing need for money, people and skills. We are risking the development of failed states, and failed states are fertile ground for anarchy and terrorism (as is the case in Afghanistan). In Iraq’s case, competing groups—Kurds, Suni, and Shia Moslems—increase the difficulty.
“Solving the Israeli-Palestinian situation is absolutely crucial and yet seems to be almost hopeless. It would be simple if it were simply a land for peace situation, but the issues are intractable and both sides have groups opposed to negotiation. Both sides have been guilty of serious miscalculation. How could the Palestinians not perceive that suicide bombers would make the Israeli people feel more intransigent? On the other hand, the Israelis are shortsighted if they feel that repression and occupation will work.

“The right of preemption is recognized in international observance, as justified in the face of imminent threat, for example in the case of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Preventive war, which is the correct name for the administration’s doctrine of preemption, means using force to prevent what you believe your enemy’s intention is, that is beyond what the evidence shows.

“Managing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an area where coalitions work. Whereas traditional arms control dealt with the balance of nuclear weapons between the U.S. and Russia, the concern today is international proliferation. Non-proliferation—preventing the spread of nuclear and biological weapons in particular (many states already had chemical weapons)—became a central policy pre-occupation in the ’90s. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions provide us with tools that establish norms. In addition, like-minded countries, mainly industrialized nations, work together through supplier groups, such as the Australia Group and the London Group, to maintain export controls over the sale of, for example, chemical and biological precursers. These rules supplement formal conventions.

“In some cases they have support from industries. The chemical industry, for instance, lobbied hard on behalf of the chemical weapons conventions. Still, controls only work if the politics are right: India developed nuclear capability because of concern about China. Pakistan is following suit because of India. North Korea is worrisome particularly because it is so hard to fathom. It is hard to imagine a satisfying solution.

“In the longer run, I believe that we will inevitably move back to the greater reliance on diplomacy, that our current disposition toward unilateral and preemptive action will self-correct. With a continued difficult situation in Iraq, public awareness will build. What’s done is done, but we will need the cooperation of others to achieve the outcome.

“Over the next 10 to 20 years, our real security will depend upon diplomacy, upon building coalitions. We should not be cavalier about getting rid of allies; we need allies.”